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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided a wide range of cases
that pertain to aviation law,' including accident litigation,2 airspace,3 airmen,
airports, 5 aircraft, 6 antitrust,

and criminal law.8 This Article focuses on

decisions by the court relating to a particular aviation law, the Airline
*
Associate Professor, University of Central Florida, Department of Legal Studies.
Professor Ravich is Board Certified in Aviation Law and served as the jointly designated
mediator in Bailey v. Rocky Mountain Holdings, LLC, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2015),
infra notes 117 and 168. Comments invited at timothy.ravich@ucf.edu.
1.
Aviation law, as a standalone subject matter, includes all facets of the law dealing
with the ownership, operation, maintenance, and use of aircraft, airports, and airspace. It also
involves licensing and aeronautical issues encompassed by the Federal Aviation Act and
associated Federal Aviation Regulations.
2.
E.g., Ridge v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 117 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1997); Hottle v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995).
3.
E.g., Walsh v. Potomac Airfield Airport, 31 F. App'x 818 (4th Cir. 2002); City of
Alexandria v. Helms, 728 F.2d 643 (4th Cir. 1984).
4.
E.g., Beauchamp v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 384 F. App'x 259 (4th Cir. 2010).
5.
E.g., Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. Horry Cty. Dep't of Airports, 735 F. App'x 810
(4th Cir. 2018); News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570
(4th Cir. 2010); All. for Legal Action v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 69 F. App'x 617 (4th Cir. 2003);
Multimedia Publ'g Co. of S.C. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154 (4th Cir.
1993); Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 279 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1960).
6.
E.g., Haynes v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 582 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1978).
7.
E.g., Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002).
8.
See generally Andrea deLorimier, Note, Flying in the Face of Suspicionless Cell
Phone Searches: Fourth Circuit Grants Airline Passengers Heightened Protection from

Searches by Customs Officers, 84 J. AIR L. & COMM. 127 (2019) (discussing United States v.
Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018)).
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Deregulation Act of 1978,9 and situates the court's approach to the law among
other jurisdictions.
Empirically, only nine written decisions by the court refer in any manner
to the Airline Deregulation Act, with the court making a substantive
determination about the law's language or policy on only four occasionsthree cases in the six-year period between 1995-2001,10 and one case in the
last seventeen years," most recently in 2018 in connection with an emerging

national controversy respecting reimbursement for air ambulance providers.12
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT

Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act more than four decades
ago to achieve a market-oriented approach to the commercial airline industry.
The law marked a momentous change from the period of 1938 to 1978 when

the federal government developed a comprehensive scheme to promote
commercial aviation by vesting extensive economic (and safety) regulatory
powers in the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB"), the predecessor entity to
today's Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA").'3 The CAB set rates for
interstate passenger air travel and controlled entry into the market through a
rigorous approval process for new routes." Under this scheme, Congress
effectively insulated early airlines from competition.
At the same time, however, state governments had the power to regulate
intrastate airfares (including those offered by interstate air carriers) and to
enforce state laws against airlines, for example laws against deceptive trade
practices.' 5 These dual regulatory regimes and collaboration between the
federal government and states caused inefficiencies in the marketplace,
however. Because the law permitted two layers of regulation, airlines were
"required to charge different fares for passengers traveling between cities,
depending on whether these passengers were interstate passengers whose
fares [were] regulated by the CAB, or intrastate passengers, whose fare [was]
regulated by a State."'16
9.
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
10. Weber v. US Airways, Inc., 11 F. App'x 56 (4th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Comair, Inc.,
134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998); Wagman v. Fed. Express Corp., 47 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table decision).
11. Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Cheatham, 910 F.3d 751 (4th Cir. 2018).
12. See id.
13. See Stephen E. Creager, Airline Deregulation andAirport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J.

319, 319-20 (1983).
14. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board
Opening Wide the Floodgatesof Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 114-17 (1979).
15. See Air Evac EMS, Inc., 910 F.3d at 755.
16. Id.
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In 1978, Congress abandoned this dual administrative system,
recognizing how common and accessible airline travel had become and how
relatively more able the airlines were to compete with one another on open
terms in a free market.' 7 Finding that "maximum reliance on competitive
market forces" would best further "efficiency, innovation, and low prices" as
well as "variety [and] quality . . . of air transportation services," Congress
eliminated the CAB and its rigid economic oversight by enacting the Airline
Deregulation Act. Critically, Congress included a preemption clause in the
Airline Deregulation Act to ensure that states would not undo federal
deregulation with regulation of their own. The clause broadly prohibits any
entity other than the federal government from enacting or enforcing any law
"relating to prices, routes, or services" of any air carrier.18
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT

The Supreme Court addressed the scope of the Airline Deregulation Act's
preemption clause for the first time in the mid-1990s in Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.1 9 Morales established the general proposition that claims

that have "a connection with, or reference to" an airline's prices, routes, or
services are preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act.20 Correlatively,
state actions that affect airline prices, routes, or services "'in too tenuous,

remote, or peripheral" a manner are not preempted. 2 1 In any case, as Justice

Scalia made clear in Morales, the preemption clause in the Airline
Deregulation Act is so vast that even statutes of general application, when
particularly applied to the airline industry, are preempted in the interest of
implementing the national legislature's policy of "ensuring that states would
not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own." 22
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 23 decided three years after Morales,

offered an important nuance to the preemption doctrine under the Airline
Deregulation Act. Specifically, Wolens carved out an exception to preemption
for contract claims against airlines such as those involving frequent flyer
programs, even when related to prices, routes, or services. 24 Writing for the
Supreme Court, Justice Ginsberg stated that lawsuits that sought

17. Id.
18. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, sec. 3(a), § 102(a), 92 Stat.
1705, 1706-07.
19. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
20. Id. at 384.
21. Id. at 390 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
22. Id. at 378.
23. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
24. Id. at 222.
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fundamentally to enforce the parties' "own, self-imposed undertakings" could
escape the preemptive effect of the Airline Deregulation Act. 25
Importantly, the breach-of-contract exception expressed in Wolens is
confined to the terms of the parties' bargain, "with no enlargement or
enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement." 26
Thus, under Wolens, a contract claim would survive preemption if the parties

limited their dispute to the terms of their bargain; however, if a court could
adjudicate a contract claim only by resorting to outside sources of law, the
claim would be preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act. 27
IV.

FOURTH

A.

CIRCUIT

REVIEW

Airline BoardingProcedures

A few years after the Supreme Court established the analytical framework
expressed in Morales and Wolens, and twenty years after Congress enacted
the Airline Deregulation Act, the Fourth Circuit considered the issue of
federal preemption in aviation in 1998, in Smith v. Comair, Inc.28 At issue in

Smith were a passenger's claims against Delta Airlines and its subsidiary,
25. Id. at 228. Justice Scalia, author of the Morales decision, took no part in Wolens.
26. Id at 233.
27. See id at 228; Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 276 (2014) (unanimous
decision) ("The Airline Deregulation Act pre-empts a state-law claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing if it seeks to enlarge the contractual obligations that the
parties voluntarily adopt.").
28. Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998). The Smith court stated that "[t]he
scope of federal preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act has not been considered in this
circuit." Id. But, three years before Smith, the Fourth Circuit had, in fact, decided a case arising
under the Airline Deregulation Act, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, Wagman v. Fed.
Express Corp., 47 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision), by applying the
Airline Deregulation Act's preemption clause. There, the Wagman family intended to file a
lawsuit based on an automobile accident in which they were involved in 1986 in New Jersey.
Id. at * 1. They sent a complaint to their attorney in Pennsylvania via Federal Express. Id "The
complaint had to be filed the next delivery day to avoid the statute of limitations, but Federal
Express delivered the package one day too late." Id Federal Express's airbill limited its liability
for lost packages to $100, unless the Wagmans, as the shipper, declared a value in excess of
$100 and paid an additional value (they did not). Id. The Wagman family then filed a $100,000
diversity action against Federal Express for negligence, breach of contract, and misleading
advertising under state consumer protection law; they alleged that "Federal Express's
advertising campaign misled its potential customers into believing packages would always be
delivered when promised." Id. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland "granted
summary judgment in favor of Federal Express, finding the state law claims preempted and
limiting Federal Express's liability to the $100 set in the contract." Id On appeal (of the
deceptive advertising claim only), the Fourth Circuit affirmed under the authority of Morales
and Wolens, holding that "the Airline Deregulation Act's preemption provision prohibit[ed] state
regulation of airline advertising pertaining to services such as Federal Express's overnight
delivery guarantee as well as to airline fares." Id. at *2.
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Comair, Inc., for breach of contract, false imprisonment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress in connection with the airline's boarding
process. 29 The plaintiff, a businessman named James Smith, was traveling on
a Comair flight operated from Roanoke, Virginia, to Minneapolis, Minnesota,
with a layover in Cincinnati. 30 The airline refused to allow him to board the
Cincinnati-Minneapolis leg of the trip because, according to the airline, he
did not match the physical description contained in his frequent-flyer
account. 3 1 That was untrue, however.

After watching his flight depart without him and after waiting three hours
at the Cincinnati airport, Smith was told by the airline's supervisor that the
real reason he was denied permission to board was that airline representative
in Roanoke had failed to ask for photo identification.3 2 The airline
representative further explained that the FAA required photo identification
pursuant to security regulations. 33 Smith, then unable to produce his driver's
license (because it was in the glove compartment of his car parked in
Virginia), offered to have his physical description faxed by the Virginia
Department of Motor Vehicles or to pay for the airline to retrieve his driver's
license in his car at the Roanoke airport, but the airline declined both.34
Instead, the airline arranged to fly Smith back to Roanoke from Cincinnati.35
Smith's frustration boiled over as he waited to board the flight to Roanoke
and he told the airline representative that he was so angry he "would like to
punch [him] in the mouth." 36 The airline supervisor then motioned for two

security guards-both of whom had been observing Smith close by for
hours. 37 When they apprehended and restrained Smith, the airline
representative asked them to remove him from the airport terminal. 38 After
Smith explained his situation to the guard and police officer, however, the
officer intervened on Smith's behalf and convinced the airline representative
to permit Smith to fly to Roanoke and Smith ultimately flew to Roanoke. 39
Sometime later Smith filed suit in the Circuit Court for the City of
Roanoke. 40 The airline defendant removed the case from state court to the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Virginia where the district court
judge granted summary judgment in favor of Comair, finding that Smith's
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Smith, 134 F.3d at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256-57.
Id.
Id.
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claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act and that his tort-based
claims failed to state a claim. 4 1 Smith appealed, arguing that by refusing him
permission to board his flight, Comair had breached a general contractual duty
to transport him to Minneapolis. 42

Framing the case in terms of Morales, Wolens, and applicable federal
aviation safety laws, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against
Smith on his breach of contract claim. 43 It reasoned, "Because Smith's
contract claim [was] based upon Comair's refusal to permit him to board, it
directly implicates the airline's discretion and/or duty under federal law.
Accordingly, the claim [was] preempted." 44 In reaching this decision, the
court gave considerable weight to the airline's position that it was entitled to
prevent Smith from boarding: (1) under federal statutory law giving airlines

wide discretion to deny boarding for safety-related reasons; and (2) pursuant
to an FAA security directive that became effective the evening before Smith's
flight. 45 In fact, because Comair invoked defenses provided by federal law,
the court concluded that Smith's contract claim could only be adjudicated by
reference to law and policies external to the parties' bargain and, therefore,
was preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act. 46
Finally, the court recognized a practical reason for rejecting Smith's
contract claim: If the court held that passengers could challenge airline
boarding procedures under general contract claims alleging failure to
transport, it would effectively allow every state to regulate an area of unique
federal concern-airline boarding practices. 47 Allowing Smith's claim to
proceed would thus frustrate an important federal objective, the court wrote,
and "[a]irlines might hesitate to refuse passage in cases of potential danger for
fear of state law contract actions claiming refusal to transport." 48
After disposing of Smith's contract claims, the court turned to Smith's
tort claims, which fared no better as a matter of law. Smith conceded that an
airline's boarding practices were properly considered a "service" under
section 41713(b)(1) of the Airline Deregulation Act, but that the airline's
particular conduct was so outrageous as to be unrelated to the provision of a
41. Id.
42. Id. at 257-58.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, sec. 204,
§ 1111(b), 88 Stat. 409, 418 (describing right to refuse transportation for various reasons
including "when, in the opinion of the carrier, such transportation would or might be inimical to
safety of flight."). Under 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2012 & Supp. 2018), airlines have the power of
"permissive refusal" and an "an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier may refuse
to transport a passenger or property the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to safety."
46. Smith, 134 F.3d at 258.
47. Id. at 258-59.
48. Id at 259.
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service and, thus, not preempted under the Second Circuit's decision in
Rombom v. United Airlines, Inc.49 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

disagreed, concluding that Smith failed to state a claim even if his tort actions
somehow could escape the preemptive sweep of the Airline Deregulation
Act.50
First, as to Smith's false imprisonment claim, the Fourth Circuit applied
the law of Kentucky (where Smith's claims occurred) as it was required to do
pursuant

to Virginia's

lex loci delicti standard."

While the

airline

representative told Smith that he was not permitted to board the flight out of
Cincinnati, the passenger's evidence failed to "show that he was compelled
either to remain or to go anywhere he did not wish" under state law, according
to the court.5 2 In fact, Smith conceded that no Comair representative told him
that he was required to remain in any specific part of the airport or that he was
not free to leave the airport. 53 For that matter, while Smith asserted that
restraint by the security officers constituted false imprisonment, even he
admitted that the officers grabbed his arms only momentarily and
nonforcefully, and then immediately interceded on his behalf to permit Smith
to board a flight back to Roanoke.5 4
Next, Smith argued that the airline representative's "outrageous
behavior-lying and rudely failing to assist him-constitute[d] intentional
infliction of emotional distress." 5 5 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, however,
relying on the Kentucky Supreme Court's adoption of Restatement (Second)

of Torts, pursuant to which "'the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable
in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and
morality."'56 While the airline representative's conduct was "unquestionably
rude and unprofessional," Judge Wilkinson wrote for the majority, "it was not
so outrageous and intolerable as to satisfy the high standard set by the
Kentucky Supreme Court." 7 Additionally, Smith failed to show that his

49. Id. (citing Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 214,222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),
for the proposition that suits are not preempted under the ADA if the airline's conduct "too
tenuously relates or is unnecessary to an airline's services").
50. Id. at 259.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 259-60 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell, 877 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ky.
App. 1994) ("Kentucky defines false imprisonment as '[a]ny exercise of force, by which in fact
the other person is deprived of his liberty and compelled to remain where he does not wish to
remain or to go where he does not wish to go."').
53. Id. at 260.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 259 (quoting Humana of Ky., Inc. v. Seitz, 796 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1990));
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
57. Id. at 260.
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alleged emotional distress was severe. 58 In fact, in his deposition, Smith
conceded that the events at issue had almost no effect on his life: "[P]ersonally
it has not affected me." 59 Because Smith failed to satisfy at least two elements
of an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, therefore, the Fourth
Circuit found that the district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of Comair.60
B.

Defining "Price"and "Service"

In 2001, three years after deciding Smith, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals was asked to decide another customer service issue that could have
been-and perhaps should have been-resolved at the ticket counter instead
of the courtroom. The case, Weber v. US Airways, Inc., 61 involved an
overbooked flight and centered on the meaning of "price" and "service" under
the Airline Deregulation Act.

The dispute in Weber arose after an airline asked for volunteers to
relinquish their seats in exchange for free round-trip tickets on a future US
Airways flight to anywhere in the continental United States. 62 Paul Weber, a
passenger on a Charleston, West Virginia, to Jacksonville, Florida, flight
volunteered. 63 When he ultimately went to redeem his travel voucher for a trip
during Thanksgiving weekend, however, he was told that the voucher was
limited to "Z-class" seats and that no such seats were available on the
requested flight. 64

Weber, claiming that he was never told there would be restrictions on the
use of his voucher, sued in West Virginia state court for breach of contract
and fraud. 65 After removing the case to the U.S. District Court of West
Virginia, US Airways moved to dismiss the fraud claim on preemption
grounds. 66 The district court granted the motion, dismissing the fraud claim
while remanding the breach of contract claim back to the state court.67 Weber
appealed. 68
Reviewing the district court's dismissal under a de novo standard, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed under the authority of Morales and Wolens. 69 The
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Weber v. US Airways, Inc., 11 F. App'x 56 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court, in a per curiam opinion held that the passenger's claim "related to"
pricing and servicing (i.e., the provision of tickets to bumped passengers) and
was barred by the preemption clause of the Airline Deregulation Act
Additionally, Weber's claim for fraud was preempted because it sought to
enforce a legal duty on the defendant that was independent of the parties'
contract. 70 The court explained that Weber's claim-essentially that the
airline had a duty to disclose the Z-class restriction before he gave up his
seat-was "no different than if the West Virginia legislature had enacted a
statute, like Illinois did in Wolens, writing that duty into the legislative
code." 7
In deciding Weber and Smith, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

employed the analytical approach adopted by a majority of federal circuitsone that gives far-reaching and maximum preemptive effect to the statutory
language of the Airline Deregulation Act.
Additionally, the court's decision in Weber was consistent with its earlier
ruling in Smith. The Weber court concluded that a passenger's breach of
contract claim stemming from a denial of boarding was preempted because it
could only be adjudicated by reference to law and polices external to the
parties' bargain in contravention of Wolens. This was similar to Smith, in

which the court decided that an airline passenger's fraud claim, ostensibly for
an omission relating to the pricing and servicing of his ticket, was preempted
because it sought to enforce a legal duty on the carrier that was independent
of the parties' contract.
Both Smith and Weber presented situations in which allowing the private
causes of action to proceed would have: (1) run afoul of the explicit language
of the Airline Deregulation Act and the language of Morales disallowing the
enforcement of state laws "relating to" airline prices and services; and (2)
contradicted the holding of Wolens pursuant to which courts should enforce a
contract based on an airline's "own, self-imposed undertakings," but not
actions that require courts to resort to sources of law external to the airlinepassenger bargain.
C.

Air Ambulances: Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Cheatham

Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Cheatham is the Fourth Circuit's most recent

decision arising from the Airline Deregulation Act. 72 The case arose in an area
of active innovation "healthcare aviation"-in which air ambulances are now
a familiar part of emergency healthcare response. 73 All over the country, but
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 57-58.
910 F.3d 751 (4th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 757.
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particularly in rural areas, air ambulances can play a vital and life-saving role
in responding to medical emergencies. 74 Air ambulance services are
exceedingly expensive, however, as a single flight can cost tens of thousands
of dollars.75 Consequently, some insurance companies have refused to pay the
full reimbursement costs, and in response, air ambulance companies have
sought payment directly from the patients, a practice known as "balancebilling."7 6 To prevent covered patients from receiving these bills, some
insurers have agreed to pay more to the air ambulance company. 7 For those
insurers that did not agree, covered patients were regrettably often stuck with
the bill for the remainder. 78

Congress addressed air ambulance billing concerns directly by enacting
the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.79 The law empowered the Secretary of
Transportation to collect more data on air ambulance pricing and provide
additional information to consumers. 80 Additionally, "it invite[d]
stakeholders, including states, into the policymaking process by forming a
committee to advise the Secretary of Transportation on air ambulance billing
practices." m Third, the law gave the Secretary authority to regulate air
ambulance companies directly, both to ensure transparency around costs and
to provide other consumer protections for customers of air ambulance
operators.8 2

Many states have also responded, attempting to both lower their own costs
and prevent the balance-billing of their citizens. 83 In recent years, states have
tried to lower prices either by regulating the amount that air ambulance
companies can charge private parties or by requiring air ambulance companies
to accept lower reimbursement rates.8 4 Air Evac EMS, Inc. concerned the

efforts of one such state, West Virginia. 85
At issue in Air Evac EMS, Inc. were West Virginia laws designed to limit

the reimbursement rates of air ambulance companies in two contexts-one for
private employees and one public employees. 86 The first was the state
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also EagleMed, LLC v. Cox, 868 F.3d 893, 903 (10th Cir. 2017).
79. Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186 (2018).
80. See Air Evac EMS, Inc., 910 F.3d at 757.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 757-58.
85. Id. at 754.
86. See W. VA. CODE § 5-16-5(c)(1) (2007) ("All financial plans required by this section
shall establish . . [m]aximum levels of reimbursement which the [PEIA] makes to categories
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workers' compensation system, which covered employees of private
companies and was managed by the state's Office of the Insurance
Commissioner ("OIC"). 87 Because the West Virginia workers' compensation
system was privatized, private insurers could negotiate and reach separate
agreements on reimbursement rates with medical service providers, including
air ambulance companies.88 But, for private insurers that did not reach
separate agreements, the reimbursement rates developed by the West Virginia
OIC applied to air ambulance services. 89
The second context was West Virginia's program for paying the medical
expenses of its own government employees, administered by the Public
Employees Insurance Agency ("PEIA").90

The measures used to lower costs were similar across the two programs. 91
For both the OIC and the PEIA, West Virginia adopted a fee schedule
covering reimbursement rates for air ambulance services that was pegged to
the federal Medicare schedule. 92 Under state law, these reimbursement rates
were the maximum allowable recovery for air ambulance services reimbursed
under the two programs. 93 Importantly, the law also established a ban on
balance-billing, such that employees covered under the OIC or PEIA plans
could not be billed directly. 94 Violations of these regulations subjected an air
ambulance company to criminal and civil enforcement actions by the state. 95
As a final cost containment measure, West Virginia also enacted a law
stating that the PEIA would not reimburse any air ambulance costs for covered
employees who entered into a separate subscription agreement with an air

of health care services."); id § 5-16-8a(a) ("[A]ny air ambulance provider . . may not collect
from the [PEIA] and the covered employee or dependent of the employee, a combined amount
for those services which exceeds the reimbursement amount then in effect for the federal
Medicare program."); id. § 5-16-8a(b) ("[T]he air-ambulance provider shall accept the fee or
cost of the subscription service agreement as payment in full for any air-ambulance transport
and related emergency treatment or services."); id. § 23-4-3(a) (2005) ("[The OIC] shall
establish . . a schedule of the maximum reasonable amounts to be paid to health care
providers . . for the rendering of treatment or services to injured employees."); id. § 23-43(a)(2) ("[T]he person, firm, or corporation rendering the treatment may not make any
charge . . against the injured employee or any other person, firm, or corporation which would
result in a total charge for the treatment rendered in excess of the maximum amount set forth [in
the OIC] schedule.").
87. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 910 F.3d at 758.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 5-16-12(a), 16-29D-8, 23-1-19(a).
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ambulance provider like Air Evac. 96 For these patients, the law effectively
capped the reimbursement at the subscription price agreed to by the individual
patient and the air ambulance company, typically about $100 per year. 97

Air Evac, an air ambulance company and registered air carrier, had
objected to the air ambulance rates for years, but stopped balance billing after
being referred to the state Attorney General for possible enforcement after it
attempted to bill state employees directly. 98 In 2016, however, Air Evac, sued

to enjoin enforcement of the West Virginia scheme as preempted by the
Airline Deregulation Act and violative of the U.S. Constitution's Contracts
Clause. 99 Air Evac's suit specifically challenged the fee schedules and other
regulations used to cap reimbursement rates covered by the PEIA and the
OIC.1 00 In response, West Virginia first argued that Air Evac lacked standing
to challenge the OIC fee schedule.101 The state also defended its scheme on
the merits, arguing both that the challenged provisions were not preempted
and that, if they were, the Airline Deregulation Act would violate the Tenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.10 2

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor
of Air Evac, finding that the state's air ambulance regulations were preempted
by the Airline Deregulation Act.1 03 As such, the district court enjoined the
state from enforcing the maximum reimbursement caps and fee schedules for
both the PEIA and the OIC, as applied to air ambulance companies.1 04 The
court also enjoined the statute requiring air ambulance providers to accept
annual subscription fees as full compensation for their services.1 05 As the
district judge explained, the West Virginia scheme both "establishe[d] the rate
of reimbursement from the PEIA and the OIC" and "foreclose[d] Air Evac's
ability to bill the patient for the full balance," in contravention of the Airline
Deregulation Act's preemption clause.1 06 (The district court did not enjoin the
balance-billing prohibition, which had only been challenged in the
alternative.)1 07

96. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 910 F.3d at 758; W. VA. CODE § 5-16-8a(b).
97. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 910 F.3d at 758.
98. Id. at 759.
99. Id.
100. Id. The separate prohibition on balance-billing was only challenged in the alternative
if the PEIA and OIC regulations were upheld. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Cheatham, 2017 WL 4765966, at *10 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 20,
2017).
105. Id. at *10.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *7.
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On appeal, the constitutional issues had fallen out of the case and the only
questions left for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to resolve, de novo,
were: (1) whether Air Evac had constitutional standing to challenge the
workers' compensation scheme; and (2) whether the state's regulations were
preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act.1 08

After concluding that Air Evac had standing insofar as it could causally
trace its alleged injury (i.e., the inability to seek full reimbursement for its
services) to West Virginia's conduct (i.e., the state's role in administering the
workers' compensation system),1 09 the court directed the majority of its
opinion to the issue of preemption. The court focused particularly on two
arguments by West Virginia for why its air ambulance regulations were not
preempted: (1) air ambulances, as an industry, are categorically outside the
scope of the Airline Deregulation Act's preemption clause; and (2) that even
if air ambulances were within the reach of the clause as a general matter, the
state's particular policies did not run afoul of the Airline Deregulation Act." 0
A threshold issue for the court in answering these questions was whether
the air ambulance industry was within the scope of the preemption clause, a
matter that turned on whether air ambulances were "air carrier[s] who may
provide transportation under" the Airline Deregulation Act."' On the one
hand, the court noted, air ambulance companies were regulated by federal
authorities as air carriers, and like all other regulated air carriers, air
ambulances were subject to FAA regulations related to safety."1 2
On the other hand, the economic authorization for air ambulances was
more complex because air ambulance companies were "air taxi operators" and
so subject to less extensive regulations than larger carriers, like major
commercial airlines or cargo transportation." 3
What is more, whereas larger air carriers were required to obtain a
"certificate of public convenience and necessity," the Secretary of
Transportation had waived this requirement for air ambulances." 4 And, air
ambulance companies were exempt from some, but not all, of the economic
regulations contained in the Airline Deregulation Act." 5 Nevertheless, the
Fourth Circuit took notice that courts that had considered the question of
whether an air ambulance operator was an air carrier under the Airline

108. Id.
109. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 910 F.3d at 759-60.
110. Id. at 759.
111. Id. at 762; see also Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
112. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 910 F.3d at 757; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44702 (2018); 14 C.F.R.
§ 135 (2019).
113. Air Evac EMS Inc., 910 F.3d at 757.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Deregulation Act had uniformly ruled that the Airline Deregulation Act
preemption clause applied to the air ambulance market."1 6
The Fourth Circuit joined this growing consensus, rejecting West
Virginia's argument to depart from a national trend recognizing air ambulance
operators as "air carrier[s] who may provide transportation" under the Airline
Deregulation Act." 7 "We have no difficulty concluding as well that air
ambulance companies are common carriers," the court stated, because
Air ambulance companies fall squarely within the definition of
common carriers. They respond whenever called by emergency
medical providers. Patients need not be subscribers or have a
preexisting contract to receive services. There is no individual
bartering between the air ambulance company and the medical
provider over whether to provide life-saving services. 1S
Having resolved that air ambulance companies were air carriers within
the meaning of the Airline Deregulation Act, the court next considered
whether they were the sort of air carriers the preemption clause was intended
to reach.119
Again aligning itself with other courts and federal agencies that had
considered the same question and reached the same result,120 the Fourth
Circuit concluded that air ambulances fell within the ambit of the preemption
116. See EagleMed, LLC, v. Cox, 868 F.3d 893, 904 (10th Cir. 2017) ("Neither Amicus
nor Defendants have presented a single textual reason to support the argument that the broad
language of the Airline Deregulation Act's express preemption provision should not include airambulance services."); Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Sullivan, 331 F. Supp. 3d 650, 662 (W.D. Tex.
2018) ("Air Evac is an air carrier under Subpart II."); Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F.
Supp. 3d 930, 933-34 (D.N.D. 2016) (finding the plaintiff air ambulance company "is an 'air
carrier' for purposes of the Airline Deregulation Act"); see also Bailey v. Rocky Mountain
Holdings, LLC, 889 F.3d 1259, 1266 n.13 (11th Cir. 2018) ("The parties do not dispute [the air
ambulance companies'] status as an air carrier.").
117. The court further explained:
West Virginia makes much of the fact that Air Evac, like other air ambulance
companies, relies on referrals from medical providers to dispatch its aircraft, rather
than responding to calls directly from the public. The state, however, has offered no
reason to think that the law turns on any such matter, especially when interpreting a
general term like "common carrier." A train does not cease to be a common carrier
simply because its tickets are exclusively sold through a third-party vendor. Air Evac,
just like its industry competitors, serves the public indiscriminately and on equal
terms, and that is what counts here.
Air Evac EMS, Inc., 910 F.3d at 764.
118. Id. at 764.
119. Id.
120. E.g., Hughes Air Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1338-39 (9th Cir.
1981); Sullivan, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 660-62; Dep't of Transp., Letter from D.J. Gribbin, Gen.
Counsel, to Hon. Greg Abbott, Texas Att'y Gen. 8 (Nov. 3, 2008).
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clause of the Airline Deregulation Act.121 In reaching this conclusion, the
court began with the text of the preemption clause itself, noting that it did not
sweep in all forms of air transportation, but only those air carriers "who may
provide air transportation under this subpart" where "subpart" referred to

subpart II of the amended Federal Aviation Act entitled "economic
regulations" and administered by the Department of Transportation.122 Hence,
only if air ambulances companies "provide[d] air transportation under
[subpart II]," could or would they be protected by the preemption clause.1 23
Within this analytical framework, the parties took different views. Air
Evac argued that an air carrier provided transportation "under" the subpart
when it was merely subject to the subpart's regulations.1 24 On this view, air

ambulance companies operated "under" subpart II because they held a
registration from the Secretary, granted pursuant to the Secretary's authority
to administer subpart II, and were required to comply with some of the
subpart's regulations.1 25

West Virginia, on the other hand, argued that certification under subpart
II was dispositive.1 26 Air ambulances were not certified under subpart II like
many other carriers, and in fact, had been exempted from the requirement to
obtain a "certificate of public convenience and necessity" by the Secretary of
Transportation pursuant to 14 C.F.R.

§ 298.1.127 Under West Virginia's view,

then, if an air carrierwas exempt from the certification requirement, it did not
"provide air transportation under" subpart II.128
As Judge Wilkinson wrote, however, the plain text of the law, the overall
structure of the federal aviation laws, and the subsequent acts of Congress all
pointed in the same direction: air ambulances were within the scope of the
Airline Deregulation Act.1 29 The court's reasoning rested on two provisions
in the law that ostensibly demonstrated Congress' ability to express its intent
expressly: 30

We agree with Air Evac that the phrase "under this subpart"includes
all air carriers regulated by the Secretary of Transportation under
subpart II, rather than those specifically certified under the subpart.
By its plain meaning, the word "under" does not suggest it is limited
121. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 910 F.3d at 764.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 765.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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to certain regulations or certain certificates. If Congress wished the
preemption clause to only apply to certain certificate-holders, it knew
how to do so. For instance, a separate provision of the statute
explicitly defines "major air carrier[s]" as those air carriers "holding
a Chapter 411 certificate" under 49 U.S.C. § 41720(a)(2). The
preemption clause, however, does not borrow this language.
The [Airline Deregulation Act's] preemption provision further
demonstrates that Congress was fully capable of tying preemption to
certification if it so desired. Immediately following the preemption
clause at issue, for example, the next sentence of the ADA reads,
"[the preemption clause] do[es]

not apply to air transportation

provided entirely in Alaska unless the transportation is air
transportation . . provided under a certification issued under Section
41102 of this title." Put simply, this language clarifies that, in Alaska
only, preemption does not apply to air carriers that do not hold
Chapter 411 certificates. Despite the fact that Congress chose to
tether preemption to certification in this one discrete context, West
Virginia asks us to adopt a certification-based reading of the
preemption clause across the board. We see no need to adopt such a
cumbersome interpretation of the statute's text when a more natural
one is available.i 3i
While the plain text sufficed to support its decision that air ambulances
fell within the scope of the Airline Deregulation Act, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals also concluded that the overall structure and operation of the
federal aviation laws supported a reading of the preemption clause that
encompassed the air ambulance industry.1 32 The court began by noting the
discretionary nature of the Secretary of Transportation's exemption granting

power for air ambulance companies from the certification requirements of
Chapter 411.133 Given this, the court rejected West Virginia's unequivocal
argument that "an exemption from certification is also an exemption from
preemption," noting that such a view, if adopted, would empower the
Secretary of Transportation "to unwind the preemptive effect of the [Airline
Deregulation Act] for air carriers as he sees fit."134 No basis existed to infer
such a vast authority, the court reasoned, particularly "when that authority was

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 765-66.
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never expressly provided and could be used to subvert one of the [Airline
Deregulation Act's] principal deregulatory goals."' 35

Additionally, the court opined that even if the text of the Airline
Deregulation Act was not clear, West Virginia's "limited reading" of the
preemption clause would reach well beyond the air ambulance sector and cut
against the core legislative aim of placing the aviation industry under a single
regulator.1 36 For example, small commuter air carriers are eligible for the
same exemption as air ambulance companies and small Canadian air taxi
operators that frequently travel to the United States are exempt from the
permitting requirement for other foreign air carriers under subpart II.137 If

these exemptions from certification were also exemptions from preemption,
states would be free to regulate these carriers.' 38
Enactment of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, which took steps to
respond to steep air ambulance prices and provide other consumer protections
for customers of air ambulance operators, further reinforced the court's view
that the Airline Deregulation Act's preemption clause extended to the air
ambulance industry. 3 9 Critically, the court noted, the law retained regulatory
authority firmly in the hands of the federal government, and "Congress's
decision to leave the preemption clause intact in the FAA Reauthorization
Act, notwithstanding other amendments to subpart II," mitigated against
importing West Virginia's "strained and unnatural reading into the words of
the [Airline Deregulation Act]."" The court thus characterized its decision
in terms of judicial restraint:

Taking together the text and structure of the statute, we conclude that
the preemption clause reaches air ambulance companies like Air
Evac. Whether Congress has acted wisely as a matter of policy is not
our business. It has spoken clearly, and it is our obligation to respect
its judgment. Appellant invites us to begin to unravel the federal
government's regulatory framework for interstate air travel, a result
Congress expressly sought to avoid with the [Airline Deregulation
Act]. The recourse the appellant seeks rests with Congress, which
alone has authority to amend the statute in a manner the state
desires. 14i

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 766.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, having determined that the Airline Deregulation Act's
preemption clause applied to the air ambulance operator, the court focused on
whether West Virginia's legislative actions also were within the scope of the
clause. The court specifically examined whether the challenged West Virginia
laws and regulations both "relate to a price, route or service" and had "the
force and effect of law."1 42
First, the court focused on the term "price" in evaluating whether West
Virginia's laws, taken together as a comprehensive scheme, "relate to a price,
route, or service" of Air Evac.1 43 The court accepted the definition of "price"
under the Airline Deregulation Act as encompassing any "rate, fare, or
charge."1 44 The court also opined that a state regulation having "a connection
with, or reference to, airline prices, routes, or services"1 45 satisfied this broad
definition. Additionally, the court recognized that "price" related to more than
just a state's attempt to regulate the price of a ticket, and consistent with
Morales, was implicated if a state law had a "forbidden significant effect" on
prices, even without referencing them directly.1 46
A fortiori, several other courts had found that state regulations structuring
reimbursements to air ambulance companies, including those that limited
patient billing and capped payments using a fee schedule, "relate to" price. 147
Those courts also concluded that even a state law incentivizing separate
agreements between air ambulance companies and private insurers met this
requirement because of the "clear and significant" effect of the law on air
ambulance compensation. 148 Ultimately, then, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that "[t]he challenged West Virginia laws clearly had a connection to air
ambulance prices" in contravention of the Airline Deregulation Act: 149
The statutes and regulations for both the OIC and the PEIA directly
reference air ambulance payments. These laws establish the
maximum amounts that the state will pay directly to air ambulance
providers, . . and limit the ability of those providers to seek recovery
from anyone else ....
The regulatory scheme only exists because West Virginia was
attempting to lower payments for air ambulance services. It set up the

entire framework to achieve this result by, for example, requiring
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 767-68.
Id at 768.
Id. at 767.
Id (quoting Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 284 (2014)).
Id. (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388 (1992)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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these companies to accept subscription fees as total reimbursement
for state employees. There was nothing subtle or indirect about this
approach; it was directly targeted at payments for air ambulance
services. If such actions involving an air carrier are not "related to
price," it is unclear what meaning the phrase would have left.15 0
The last question evaluated by the court was whether the challenged
provisions had "the force and effect of law.""' West Virginia argued they did
not, and instead reflected nothing more than the state's participation in the
health insurance market-actions taken to address air ambulance prices that
were no different from those of a private insurer bargaining to obtain the best
price. 5

2

The Fourth Circuit disagreed, however, concluding that West

Virginia did not act like a private insurer in its regulation of the air ambulance
market but rather "used the coercive power that only sovereigns possess to
achieve its goals." That is,
Through this combination of low reimbursement rates, refusals to pay
for certain services, and prohibitions on directly billing patients, West
Virginia [had avoided] the problems faced by private insurers in the
marketplace . . [and]
simply
dictated
a relatively
low
reimbursement rate and prohibited any additional recovery. Under
these regulations, the state face[d] no pressure to bargain up front,
and no threat of patients being directly billed on the back end, thereby
lowering total reimbursement costs.' 53
Accordingly, the court held that West Virginia's actions had the force and
effect of law.1 4
In explaining its holding, the court elaborated upon an important

consideration in the federal-state relationship, including preemption, namely
whether the state was acting as a regulator-arraying its police power to
coerce private conduct-or was instead acting as a market participant-using

its bargaining power to achieve a desirable policy.' As the court noted:
Once the line between the two is drawn, the application is
straightforward: when the state acts as a market participant, it is
treated like a private party in the same market; when the state acts as

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 767-68 (citations omitted).
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 768.
Id.
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a regulator, it is subject to the unique limits placed on states by our
federal system.
The market participant distinction is relevant here because a state's
use of its buying power in the marketplace does not have "the force
and effect of law." [In Am. Trucking Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles,]

the Supreme Court explained that this "phrasing [the force and effect
of law] targets the State acting as a State, not as any market actoror otherwise said, the State acting in a regulatory rather than
proprietary mode."1 5 6

Against this backdrop the court stated that "[w]hat matters is that the state
respect the line between regulatory power and market power, such that the
terms of the deal reflect 'agreements freely made, based on needs perceived
by the contracting parties at the time.'"1

57

West Virginia's program crossed

this line according to the Fourth Circuit. The state's laws both limited
reimbursement rates paid by the state and prevented air ambulance companies
from seeking additional recovery from any third party.1 58 If a company
objected, it faced the prospect of enforcement actions.1 59 Such a scheme,
"government dictates backed by civil and criminal sanctions, the court wrote,
"counts as action 'having the force and effect of law' if anything does."1 60 As
such, like other courts that had adjudicated similar efforts to limit third party
payments for air ambulance services, the Fourth Circuit had no trouble
concluding that the state was acting in its regulatory, not proprietary,

capacity.161
Finally, the court reasoned that the market participant distinction was in
line with the Airline Deregulation Act's preemption clause, which "protects
air carriers from 'state-imposed obligations' related to their prices, routes, or
services, not from their 'own, self-imposed undertakings"' as detailed in
Wolens.1 62 Given the purpose of the Airline Deregulation Act to promote open
market competition, moreover, the market participant distinction made
"perfect sense" to the Fourth Circuit, particularly in light of Wolens in which
the Supreme Court recognized that the Airline Deregulation Act "was
designed to promote maximum reliance on competitive market forces [and]

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'nv. City of Los Angeles, 569 U.S. 641, 650 (2013)).
Id. at 769 (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 230 (1995)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Am. TruckingAssn, 569 U.S. at 651).
Id.
Id. at 768 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 229).
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[m]arket efficiency requires effective means to enforce private
agreements."1 63
That said, the Fourth Circuit opined that while the Airline Deregulation
Act certainly limited the options available to states, it did not envision that
states like West Virginia played no role, and in fact, states retained the power
to influence the prices of air ambulance providers, albeit not by legislation:
This is not to say that West Virginia cannot, moving forward, bargain
for lower payments to air ambulance companies. It would be
permissible for the state to use its considerable purchasing power as
the insurer of state employees to negotiate better rates up front or
limit reimbursements for air ambulance services after the fact.
As the program for state employees, the PEIA is a large part of the
healthcare market in West Virginia and nothing in the preemption
provision prevents that market power from playing a role at the
negotiating table. The ADA does not require a state to pay whatever
an air carrier may demand. In obtaining favorable terms, however, it
must be the state's market power, and not its unique coercive
authority, that is driving the negotiation.1 64
IV. CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal's jurisprudence
under the Airline Deregulation Act reflects both a judicial conservatism and a
faith in federalism and the legislative process. After all, as the court has noted,
the Airline Deregulation Act itself expressed a commitment to work with state
governments in developing uniform national policy.1 65 As such, the court's
"decision[s are] not one[s] of policy, but of law. That must be in the end what
matters."1

66

Be that as it may (or must), no plaintiff has prevailed in a case at

the level of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals arising under the Airline
163. Id. (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 230).
164. Id. at 769. The district court enjoined the statutes and regulations related to both the
PEIA and OIC fee schedules and reimbursement caps. It dismissed Air Evac's alternative claim
that the balance-billing provisions were preempted. Neither party on appeal sought review of
that dismissal. Thus, the question of whether the fee schedule could be maintained without either
the reimbursement caps or balance-billing provisions was not before the court, and the court did
not consider whether the fee schedule, standing alone, had the force and effect of law. Id. at 769
n.3 (citations omitted). That said, the court stated: "Nothing in our analysis forecloses the
possibility that West Virginia, acting as a market participant, could use a uniform fee schedule
to structure its own payments for air ambulance services in the absence of both the caps and the
balance-billing prohibitions." Id. at 769.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Deregulation Act. The Air Evac EMS, Inc. case may be the most noteworthy
in this respect.
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit's (principled) decision to include air
ambulances and state laws aimed at mitigating their fees and costs within the
scope of the Airline Deregulation Act is troubling at a practical level, as
evidenced by the increasing amount of attention, commentary, and litigation
on the topic. 67 Even the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed
surprise that states like West Virginia have not pushed back on the
deregulatory purpose of the Airline Deregulation Act; states instead seem to
aruge that the federal law leaves them powerless to address local problems
particularly with high costs for air ambulances services, an industry that has
grown substantially since the federal government deregulated airlines in the
late 1970s.1 68
As such, consumer protection advocates will detest the Air Evac EMS,
Inc. case, as it reflects a technical application of the law that may leave
uninsured or underinsured patients stuck with thousands of dollars in medical
costs. Could Congress really have imagined or intended that result when it
prohibited states from enacting or enforcing any law related to airline prices,
routes, or services, as part of a broader policy reset designed to unshackle the
airline industry from the regulatory and economic burdens imposed by the
167. See generally GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-292, AIR AMBULANCE:
AVAILABLE DATA SHOW PRIVATELY-INSURED PATIENTS ARE AT FINANCIAL RISK 19 (Mar.

2019) (stating some states have attempted to limit potential air ambulance billing through public
attention); Andrew J. Upton, Air Ambulance Reform Why Congress Should Exempt Air
Ambulancesfrom "Carrier"ClassificationandPreemption under the Airline DeregulationAct,
82 J. AIR L. & COMM. 431, 443 (2017) (noting that several states in attempting to regulate the
industry are met with resistance by the courts); Karan Chhabra et al., Are Air Ambulances Truly
Flying Out of Reach? Surprise-BillingPolicy and the Airline DeregulationAct, HEALTH AFF.
(Oct.
17, 2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2Ol9lOl6.235396/full/
[https://penna.cc/GV75-DSNM]; Tanner Holton, Air Ambulance Service Providers: A
Lifesaving Industry and a FinancialCatastrophe, 92 N.D. L. REV. 473 (2017) (noting states
have tried to take action regulating air ambulances). Lower court cases expanding the act to
include air ambulances have emerged recently after the industry's aggressive legal strategy. See
generally Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 2019 WL 4573700 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 20,
2019); Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., 922 F.3d 1053 (10th Cir. 2019); Guardian Flight, LLC v.
Godfread, 359 F. Supp. 744 (D.N.D. 2019); PHI Air Med., LLC v. N.M. Office of
Superintendent of Ins., 2018 WL 6478626 (D.N.M., Dec. 10, 2018); Chanze v. Air Evac EMS,
Inc., 2018 WL 5723947 (N.D. W. Va., Nov. 1, 2018); Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Air Evac EMS, Inc.,
341 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ohio 2018); Schnerberger v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 749 F. App'x 670
(10th Cir. 2018); Ferrell v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 900 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2018); Air Evac EMS,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 331 F. Supp. 3d 650 (W.D. Tex. 2018); Pratt v. AirEvac Lifeteam, 329 F. Supp.
3d 722 (W.D. Mo. 2018); Bailey v. Rocky Mountain Holdings, LLC, 889 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir.
2018); Stout v. Med-Trans Corp., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2018); EagleMed LLC v.
Cox, 868 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 2017); Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930
(D.N.D. 2016).
168. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 910 F.3d at 769-70.
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CAB? Surely Congress could have said so more explicitly and in a manner
that would have saved courts and litigants the time and money involved in
wrangling over technical phrases like "under this subpart," "related to," and
"prices, routes, and services."169
Going forward, an open question exists as to what the Air Evac EMS, Inc.
case portends in terms of federalism, preemption, and state rights in the
context of emerging and yet-imagined aerial technologies and services such
as advanced air mobility and drone delivery. Time will tell. For now, the Air
Evac EMS, Inc., together with the Smith, Wagman, and Weber decisions

discussed above, reflect judicial decisions that strike an appropriate
understanding of the court's role as a decisionmaker and not a lawmaker. 170
As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has said: "The balance of state and
federal responsibility created by the [Airline Deregulation Act] is a complex
balance in an exhaustively debated field that Congress has struck. As to that,
'

we take no sides."' 7

169. Id. at 756.
170. Id. at 770.
171. Id.
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